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Abstract
To understand the epistemological meaning of simulation, it does not suffice to interpret
simulation practice and theory in the framework of philosophy of science alone. Theory,
experiment, measurement and observation are important activities of the scientific method. But
what regards an epistemological interpretation of simulation, philosophical truth theories allow
gaining additional insights. This paper discusses philosophical truth theories — e.g. the
correspondence, coherence and consensus theory — and relates them to simulation practice
and methodology, focussing on validation.
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 Introduction
1.1
Simulation literature in philosophy of science and literature on validation never mention
philosophical truth theories (e.g. Humphreys 2004; Sargent 2004), although validation is the
"truth" topic in simulation. Why are established philosophical truth theories and their ultimate
aim to understand the relation between the human mind, knowledge and reality, so much
neglected in simulation theory?
1.2
Part of the answer might be the widespread sceptiscism what regards the role of philosophy
towards science, especially towards natural science. What exactly is that relation between
philosophy and science or especially simulation, a newly established scientific research practice?
One of the most important goals of the philosophy of science is to clarify the epistemological
status of scientific knowledge, according to the philosophical definition of knowledge as a
justified true belief (Ladyman 2002). Justification, truth and belief are the three cornerstones of
modern epistemology. In this paper I will concentrate on the notion of truth since every modeller
would agree that simulations at least should have something that is applicable to reality, to the
things "out there", and therefore they should obviously include some degree of "truth". If a
simulation has nothing to do with truth, then it might be a video game, but does certainly not10/30/2005 12:10 PM Alex Schmid: What is the Truth of Simulation?
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deliver scientific knowledge. Validation is the specific procedure that is supposed to consider the
"truthfulness" or applicability of a simulation model. But why should we consider philosophical
"truth" instead of mere applicability or usefulness for a certain purpose that a client and a
simulation expert may have in mind?
Truth and complexity
2.1
If simulations are known to capture complexity, making it more comprehensible, then — and
this is my thesis — to just consider applicability for a certain system, or usefulness for a certain
purpose does not do justice to the epistemological complexity of the simulation practice. What
does applicability exactly mean? What kind of relation does applicability really establish between
a model, a client and the target system? What correspondence of target system and model, what
consensus of ideas, believes and common understandings shapes the usefulness of the
simulation, and what coherence of scientific theories, axioms and deductions goes into the
concept of applicability? It is obvious that with the application of the philosophical concept of
truth we step one level deeper into the understanding of certain simulation assumptions and
parts of the simulation process. I do not assume that this level of epistemological
considerations should be a matter of everyday modelling and simulation. But if we want to
understand the true epistemological complexity of simulation practice — the notion of "practice"
itself points at the complexity of the simulation process — philosophical epistemology and the
notion of truth in particular provide a sound basis to do so. If we stay in the framework of
philosophy of science, of theory, experiment, hypothesis, observation and measurement we
might not capture the underlying complexity.
Philosophical truth theories
3.1
First, there is the question if simulations are truth worthy at all. In philosophical terms, truth
worthy is an object to which the concept of truth is applicable in principal, or in other words, of
which it makes sense to speak of truth. Traditionally, linguistic objects like propositions or
judgements are the main objects of truth. If one considers mathematics as a language capable
of true statements and at the same time taking into account the communicative and linguistic
nature of simulations in general, it should be obvious that simulations principally are truth
worthy.
3.2
But once again, why should we apply truth to simulation instead of other more practical
concepts like adequacy, clearness or efficiency? I would argue that all these views are present in
the different philosophical truth perspectives and in addition, these perspectives offer a broader
historical and scientific framework, deepening the epistemological discussion on simulation.
Adequacy or applicability for example are concepts that can be more thoroughly discussed in
the context of the multi-layered philosophical theory of truth than just as a concept in their
own right.
3.3
The philosophy of science has developed a body of concepts like scientific realism,
foundationalism, instrumentalism and falsificationism which all have a certain relation to the
fundamental theories of philosophical truth. In fact, scientific realism includes some sort of
correspondence theory of truth, supposing an objective connection or correspondence between
our (simulation) statements and the existing things out there whereas instrumentalism links
with some sort of coherence theory. But this layer of argument we will not taking into account if
we think about the truth of simulation. We refer directly to the underlying fundamental
philosophical theories. Unfortunately, there is not only one philosophical theory of truth but
many. We can't expect therefore to find one relation or one solution for our question. Instead,
we will find many useful truth criteria. Our guiding question can be stated as follows: What are10/30/2005 12:10 PM Alex Schmid: What is the Truth of Simulation?
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the truth theories or criteria from the philosophical tradition that offer a suitable theoretical and practical
value in order to deal with the truth value of simulations?
3.4
From all the different philosophical truth theories we will only consider the correspondence theory
of truth, the consensus theory, and the coherence theory. Obviously, these are not all
philosophical theories, but from the point of view of simulation the most important ones. Every
theory of truth offers another perspective on the philosophical "truth landscape" and it seems
interesting to relate these perspectives to the different perspectives under which simulations are
undertaken and applied.
3.5
The first theory, the correspondence theory of truth (see James 1907, Russell 1946) can be stated
as follows: the criterion for a true proposition is the correspondence with a fact of reality. A
simulation related version of the correspondence principle can be stated as: 1) A simulation
model is true if and only if it corresponds to a matter of fact in reality.
3.6
Two fundamental questions follow from this priniciple: how is it possible to define this
correspondence relation between statement and reality and what exactly means the concept of
"reality"? Obviously, there is no final answer to these questions in philosophy, but there is an
interesting aspect in relation to simulation which follows from the correspondence principle.
The correspondence principle assumes that a simulation or mathematical proposition refers to
one and only one matter of fact in reality. Hence, does this mean that a simulation model as an
imitation of a system is one and only one proposition like "all men are mortal"? Does a
simulation system suggest one proposition and only one or do the parts of the simulation
model correspond to different parts of reality, the parts of the system? Or does the "system
behaviour" consist of one proposition whereas the behaviour of parts or variables mean
different propositions? But then what is the "truth relation" between these levels of propositional
content? What does it mean if we consider the correspondence of processes? What specifically is
it that a simulation corresponds to, and what "shape" of reality do we mean when we talk about
this correspondence?
3.7
And what about "imaginary" simulations, simulations with parameter values not directly found in
nature as in certain cosmological simulations? What exactly is the correspondence between a
simulation model that relies on the fundamental constants of nature and another model that
alters these constants in certain way to produce a different universe? Intuitively we know that
there is a certain correspondence since the second simulation is a deviation of the first one. But
it is another thing to define the "truth value" of the imaginary simulation since obviously it is
not completely false, but how exactly does its deviation correspond to the "real" universe?
3.8
The correspondence principle of truth, the oldest truth theory which goes back to ancient
Greece, which basically constitutes an "objective" "reality perspective", can be a mean to critically
reflect all these relations. For example how objective is a simulation what regards its
correspondence to a real system, and how subjective is the same model what regards its implicit
assumptions, which we will refer to below in the consensus theory of truth? Other fundamental
tensions between reality and models as complexity and simplicity, subtlety and concreteness or
definiteness and indefiniteness (Pidd 2002) are additional factors that can be better understood,
communicated and criticized taking into account the correspondence theory of truth.
3.9
The consensus theory of truth points in another direction and opens up a further perspective
apart from the reality perspective. The simulation related version of the consensus theory can
be stated as follows: 2) A simulation model is true if and only if it is rationally acceptable under ideal or
optimal conditions.10/30/2005 12:10 PM Alex Schmid: What is the Truth of Simulation?
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3.10
This principle highlights at the same time the rational and social aspects of truth and
constitutes basically a "community perspective", present for example in Soft Systems Methodology
(SSM) and in mental models in System Dynamics. The perspective of consensus entails a
basically social and rational focus of truth (Habermas 1973). Simulations not only have an
"objective" relation to reality but they exist in a "subjective" rational and communicative context.
Of course, it is an open dispute about the objectivity or subjectivity of correspondence and
consensus respectively, but the tendencies are clear.
3.11
Correspondence and consensus theories are different approaches and exhibit intermingling
perspectives upon the "truth landscape" of simulations. Apart from the difficulties that the
notion of ideal and optimal conditions is setting up in a philosophical context, the perspective
of consensus theory offers a feasible approach to discuss the communicative agreements
assessing the truth value of simulations. A simulation therefore relies fundamentally on the fact
that its structure and its output are acceptable for rationally thinking people. How this process
works in detail and the relative importance of this approach in relation to other perspectives,
are questions that can be discussed based on the consensus theory of truth.
3.12
The third theory, the coherence theory of truth can be stated as follows: 3) A simulation model is
true if and only if it is a member of a coherent system of believes. Following the coherence principle a
simulation must be logically consistent and non-contradictory in a network of other believes
(Blanshard 1939). If simulation results are not compatible with this system of believes, they
can't be true. Intuitively, this truth approach which constitutes some kind of "discourse
perspective" points to some difficulties. Particular strengths of simulations, as the discovery of
emergent behaviour in complex systems or counterintuitive results, seem to be cases against
this truth approach. Accordingly, there is no place for novelty in a coherent system of
established believes. An additional philosophical criticism also states that there may be a
coherent but nevertheless false systems of beliefs; it is not necessary in principle that a
coherent system of beliefs must have a truth relationship to reality - it can be coherent and
false at the same time. But the theory has its useful aspects in relation to the simulation effort
since it states that — in contrast to the communication driven consensus theory — every
simulation has its roots in a systematic discourse framework, might that be an economical,
professional or historical discourse.
Validity, accuracy and truth
4.1
After we have explained the different epistemological truth theories, we will consider a "test
case" for the application of philosophical truth theory, namely a part of the simulation process,
conceptual model validation. The two key concepts in validation are sufficient accuracy and specific
purpose (Robinson 2004).I will define these concepts in validation as follows: "Validation is the
process of determining the sufficient accuracy to which a model or simulation is a representation of the
real world system from the perspective of the specific purpose of the model or simulation."
4.2
Validity and accuracy have different decision values. While validity is a binary yes/no decision,
accuracy is measured on a scale of zero to 100% (Robinson 2004). Robinson gives the example
of a simulation model being absolutely inaccurate due to the lack of any empirical data, but it
used to be still "valid" since it served the purpose of the simulation to show management that
simulation in general would be one possible way to optimize the manufacturing process.
Though the model lacked any sufficient accuracy, it was still valid from the perspective of its
purpose. It follows that accuracy and validity don't need to match. A model can still be useful
when its validity is given and its accuracy is poor.10/30/2005 12:10 PM Alex Schmid: What is the Truth of Simulation?
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4.3
Truth theories might help to understand the deeper epistemological meaning of these terms.
Validity is closely related to purpose, and from an epistemological perspective purpose
presupposes some more or less coherent structure of beliefs. If a certain purpose is not an
irrational outbreak of arbitrariness, it is based on a chain of beliefs where an accomplished
purpose is linked with a new state that in turn is the basis for a new purpose and so on.
4.4
What do we mean by saying a model is valid? In principal, we say nothing at all what regards the
objective perspective of the correspondence theory that relates a model with reality. Validity
refers primarily to the subjective part of a simulation, based on certain beliefs how a model
should behave to meet the purpose. Back to our example: the coherent validity of the model for
the manufacturer's management team may be absolutely wrong what regards its
correspondence to reality, but the simulation reveals both truth of coherence and consensus
because it satisfies the subjective purpose. Philosophically speaking, there is no solid ground
for reasoning that a valid model is "less" true because it is not accurate. It is "accurate" and true
from the point of view of consensus and coherence.
4.5
As modellers we are used to think in terms of correspondence or the accurateness of a
simulation model to a target system which is a heritage of the scientific method in general. What
we try to achieve is an accurate representation of the system in reality. We agree that sometimes
a less accurate simulation model might be acceptable since it serves the customer needs. But we
are not used to think that the inaccurate model has fundamentally the same truth value as the
accurate model, albeit on different "truth levels".
4.6
The thought of "the equal truth of the inaccurate" is a challenging one for simulation practitioners,
and that is exactly what the application of truth theories in simulation is aimed at: to challenge
the epistemological bias of simulation practice and theory. Philosophical truth theories are
neither right nor wrong, but they are different perspectives to discuss the problem in question.
In addition, epistemology and truth theories highlight the importance and dynamics of non-
mathematical human beliefs that are essential for science in general and simulation in
particular.
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